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ABSTRACT My paper deals with indigenous peoples’ rights, focusing on Latin 
American case-law related to gender issues. Latin American Courts have faced 
cases related to sexual crimes or domestic violence among indigenous people 
and have to choose between giving pre-eminence to women’s rights or indi-
genous autonomy. On deciding those cases, the tools provided by the propor-
tionality test are paramount in order to analyse the case-law. The indigenous 
rights regimes (ILO-169, UNDRIP) may prevail or not against other human 
rights systems (which specially protect women or children) according to the 
facts of the case, but also according to domestic legal cultures modelled by the 
country’s historical evolution.
KEYWORDS Indigenous peoples; women’s rights; legal culture.
RESUMEN Este trabajo analiza los derechos de los pueblos indígenas, centrán-
dose en la jurisprudencia latinoamericana relacionada con cuestiones de géne-
ro. Los tribunales latinoamericanos han enfrentado casos relacionados con crí-
menes sexuales o violencia intra-familiar entre indígenas y tienen que decidir 
entre dar preeminencia a los derechos de las mujeres o la autonomía indígena. 
Al resolver estos casos, las herramientas proporcionadas por el test de pro-
porcionalidad son esenciales para analizar la jurisprudencia. Los regímenes de 
derechos indígenas (ILO-169, UNDRIP) pueden prevalecer o no contra otros 
sistemas de derechos humanos (que protegen especialmente a las mujeres o 
los niños) de acuerdo con los hechos del caso, pero también de acuerdo con 
la cultura jurídica modeladas por la diversa evolución histórica de cada país.
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Introduction
In the last 20 years there have been important achievements in the implementation 
of indigenous peoples’ rights. However, there are still relevant challenges. The Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the Indigenous and Tri-
bal Peoples Convention, 1989 (ILO-169) regimes acknowledge indigenous people as 
right-holders of international individual and collective rights. That idea has triggered 
a legal revolution in the Americas: natives have started using international provisions 
in environmental, natural resources and criminal trials with relative success1.
Women’s rights are expressly protected by the UNDRIP/ILO-169 and the Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CE-
DAW). However, both regimes could collide and indigenous autonomy (indigenous 
tribunals, or the respect for native customary law as a source of law), granted by 
the UNDRIP/ILO-169, could negatively affect vulnerable people, such as women and 
children. There has been relevant case-law on sexual crimes and domestic violence, 
which has to balance different human rights regimes (ILO-169/UNDRIP, the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child [CRC] and CEDAW). In order to sol-
ve those conflicts of human rights regimes, courts have used, directly or indirectly, 
the proportionality test, a wide-spread tool in constitutional adjudication. This test 
is also a very useful legal tool in order to examine this particular kind of case-law. 
The generated jurisprudence is dissimilar in different Latin American countries since 
indigenous cultures have impacted diverse countries in a dissimilar way. The topic is 
interdisciplinary since the presence of anthropologists or ethnographers as expert 
witnesses has been fundamental in order to clarify those conflicts. At the same time, 
this collision of international regimes is a significant issue to attorneys, human rights 
activists, and scholars.
This paper intends to explore the adjudication of these kind of cases theoretical 
and practical implications by examining case-law from Chile, Colombia and Boli-
via. I will argue that the proportionality test, described by Robert Alexy, has been 
an instrument in the adjudication of this sort of cases and also a useful analysis tool. 
At the same time, the relative impact of indigenous culture in each country may tip 
the balance of justice. Judges consider the relevance of indigenous culture in order to 
“weigh” the rights in conflict. As I will examine, every country’s own history influen-
ces its legal culture, affecting the balance of interests in competition. Legal culture, in 
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1. I use the terms first peoples, first nations, aboriginal peoples, native peoples, autochthonous 
peoples as synonyms of indigenous peoples.
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turn, is essential in order to understand how domestic courts adjudicate conflicting 
fundamental rights and why they give precedence of one over the other.
History and Legal Culture
It is clear that knowing the past is vital to understand the present and foresee the 
future. Historical roots are diverse in every country and, as a consequence, their legal 
systems have developed in different ways2. Legal institutions and lawyers’ minds are 
shaped by historical experience and shared culture; this accumulative process creates 
a “national character” of some kind. Then, evolutionary trends and the explanation 
of some judicial decision may be, in part, inferred from historical data. In fact, judges 
decide cases considering abstract legal principles and rules guided, in part, by their 
intuition, which is, to some extent, ruled by the “silently operating powers” (Von Sa-
vigny, 1831, p. 31) of domestic culture and tradition. Culture could be defined as “the 
shared knowledge and schemes created by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, 
expressing, and responding to the social realities around them” (Lederach, 1995, p. 
9). According to Glenn, tradition is composed of cultural data brought from the past 
into the present (Glenn, 2004, pp. 13-50). As said by Bell, legal culture is “a specific 
way in which values, practices, and concepts are integrated into the operation of legal 
institutions and the interpretation of legal texts” (Bell, 1995, p. 70). Those definitions 
make clear that values, particularly the religious ones, could be part of a national legal 
framework and, consequently, a current domestic legal system cannot be fully un-
derstood without knowing the history that shapes the cultural tradition of particular 
states (Hobsbawm, 2012, pp. 1-14).
The relative importance of indigenous culture in diverse Latin American coun-
tries is one of those silent operating forces and has played a relevant role in recent 
developments in the area after the end of dictatorships. It is evident that, for example, 
Bolivia has a strong presence of indigenous peoples. Bolivia was one of the centres of 
the Inca Empire, a civilization that was extremely complex and sophisticated (Baudin, 
1961, reprint 1991). At the same time, the percentage of indigenous population is high 
in comparison to other countries. The democratic forces shaped the Assembly 2009 
Constitution, which converted Bolivia into the Plurinational State, describing it as a 
“plurinational communal and social unified state”, which is a “profound reconfigura-
2. The same phenomenon can be appreciated in Europe. European countries, with different histori-
cal backgrounds, are part of the ECHR. Due to that, the ECtHR had developed the notion of margin 
of appreciation in order to keen under the same umbrella countries with different legal and cultural 
traditions, such as Spain and Turkey. Then, the Court has to unify the human rights standards and, 
at the same time, allow some legal diversity. Religion has had diverse influence in different states 
with varied results. It is natural that the ECtHR takes into account those variations and all of the 
dissimilar outcomes will be legitimate.
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tion of the state itself” (Assies, 2011, pp. 93-116) by recognising the rights to internal 
self-determination of various indigenous peoples within a single state. In fact, the 
New Constitution established a quota of indigenous parliamentarians. At the same 
time, an indigenous-peasant judicial system was created, which hold the same legal 
status as ordinary justice (the members of the Plurinational Constitutional Court are 
chosen from both systems)3. Finally, the right to autonomy, indigenous self-govern-
ment and their territorial entities and institutions were formally recognised. Theo-
retically, the Bolivian State, therefore, does not merely “acknowledge” indigenous 
rights but is constituted and defined by indigenous peoples (Yrigoyen, 2011, p. 149).
Colombia grants wide autonomy to indigenous peoples too.  According to Colombian 
Courts, treaties as the ILO-169 have constitutional rank (human rights international 
agreements are also the highest law of the land) and they accept a widespread degree 
of legal pluralism. The 1991 Constitution incorporated many of the indigenous peo-
ples demands accumulated over decades. It opened special political arenas for them. 
For instance, Articles 171 and 176 provide special representation in the parliament. 
Article 356 guarantees indigenous peoples’ territorial and cultural rights.  Previous 
to the Spanish conquest, the Muisca (also called Chibchas) Confederation dominated 
the area, which was one of the best-organised governments of diverse tribes on the 
Americas.
On the other hand, Chile for example, there is no recorded knowledge indicating 
the existence of an advanced indigenous civilization before the Conquest and the 
quantity of native population in its territory was not as relevant as which the Con-
quistadors found in the areas dominated by the Incas or the Aztecans. The current 
Chilean Constitution does not mention indigenous people at all. In 1988, General Pi-
nochet lost a referendum and, consequently, the Constitution re-established a typical 
Western democracy, as it was until 1973. One of the modifications made human right 
treaties automatically part of the Chilean legal system. One of these treaties was the 
ILO-169, ratified in 2008. Even though the application of this international agreement 
has developed relevant case-law, Chilean Courts just recognise indigenous people as 
a vulnerable minority and their customs are only an incidental source of law, but they 
do not enjoy the right to internal self-determination.
All Latin American courts use the proportionality test in order to provide the ba-
ses of their decisions. Every time a court assesses a case, it has to balance the rights 
or interests in conflict. According to Alexy, judges decide those conflicts “weighing” 
the rights in competition (for example, freedom of expression versus privacy). Then, 
it is easy to assume that Chilean Courts and the Bolivian or Colombian ones would 
give relatively different “weight” to indigenous rights since they have diverse history 
3. Articles 179.II, 190-192, 197.I and 199.II of the Bolivian Constitution.
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and legal evolution. I will try to prove, with case-law, that domestic courts from di-
verse Latin-American states assign different “weight” to specific rights depending on 
their particular own legal culture or tradition, which has deep roots in their distinct 
history.
Proportionality Test and Legal Culture
Human Rights Adjudication: Rules and Principles
Courts have to balance several interests in order to adjudicate case law related to fun-
damental rights. The mechanics of that balance have been defined by Robert Alexy. 
He has described a system-based legal analysis, a holistic way of approaching the ju-
dicial adjudication (Kumm, 2004, pp. 574-596). According to his theory, fundamental 
rights (recognised by constitutions and/or human rights treaties) are hierarchically 
superior. They have the highest significance for people and society and have an “open 
texture”, which makes some degree of legal indeterminacy inevitable - using Hart’s 
terms (Hart, 1982, p. 124).
According to Alexy, fundamental rights have the structure of legal principles, in 
opposition to legal rules. Guido Alpa remarks that the terms “rules” and “principles” 
are terms commonly used in law. Legal principles are fundamental legal notions: ge-
neral abstract norms applicable to many singular concrete instances which represent 
fundamental values. Instead, rules are concrete and detailed norms which regulate 
a determinate range of situations (Alpa, 1994, pp. 1-37). In order to understand the 
nature of fundamental rights it is essential to know Alexy’s particular distinction bet-
ween rules and principles. In his view, rules could either apply or not, while principles 
can be fulfilled to varying degrees, because they are “optimisation requirements”. A 
rule is an accurate norm, such as the rule that establishes the difference between 
adults and children, whose age is normally set to 18 years old (Article 1 of the CRC, 
or the national rules which set a different one, those are also important for the age 
of consent as I will analyse later) or the rules that define who is indigenous. On the 
other hand, indigenous autonomy is a principle. It will receive only partial application 
because state regulations (rules on judicial review of indigenous courts by ordinary 
courts, the prohibition of torture) and other rights/principles (children’s progressive 
autonomy, due process of law, for example) or collective interests (such as public or-
der) will have to be taken into consideration. Then, the “principle” indigenous auto-
nomy could be restricted by rules or other principles/fundamental rights.
“Optimisation requirements”, such as principles, need that something is realised 
to the greatest extent possible given legal (other competing legal principles and rules) 
and factual possibilities (circumstances of the case proven by evidence). In simple 
words, indigenous autonomy is an elastic concept, which will be maximised by courts 
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if they do affect the core of other principles or if there are clear restrictive rules. 
Principles do not prescribe accurately what should be done; they just give a general 
orientation because they are “framework/norme quadre” norms. Alexy believes that 
fundamental rights are principles in the sense described above (Alexy, 2002b, p. 55). 
They are not clearly defined according to “bright-line” standards, which leave space 
for varying interpretation. According to Alexy, fundamental rights are legal princi-
ples, elastic norms or “ideal ought” that need to be “optimised” by a decision-maker. 
As it was said, principles are different from rules. The latter are norms which are 
more precise and give fewer margins of choices to the decision-maker (Alexy, 2002b, 
pp. 44-47). Then, adjudication and legal reasoning work differently for both kinds of 
norms. Rules are applied by means of subsumption (using logic criteria such as spe-
ciality, chronologic and hierarchy tests).  Principles are applied by balancing (using al-
gebraic/arithmetic criteria) (Alexy, 2003, pp. 433-449). Conflicts of rights-principles 
are “difficult” or hard cases, because there are not always bright-line rules (Sullivan, 
1992, pp. 22-123. From a general point of view, including Europe (Sottiaux & Van Der 
Schyff, 2008, pp. 115-156)4.
Modern public law does not conceive rights as an absolute sphere of autonomy 
where the state cannot intervene. Limitations by public bodies exercising public 
power in order to protect collective interests, such as “public health”, are common 
(Loughlin, 2010, p. 369). Another limitation is the “rights of other people”: a conflict 
among two or more rights will be adjudicated by courts balancing competing princi-
ples (Alexy, 2002b, pp. 69-86-102). In a given case, according to Alexy, courts have to 
balance the different interest in conflict using the proportionality test. Proportionali-
ty is a tool for judging whether any potentially justified interference with a right is the 
minimum interference necessary to secure the legitimate goal of a state measure. As 
a result, proportionality assesses the level of interference in order to consider it legiti-
mate or unlawful. Human rights agreements grant special rights to vulnerable groups 
such as indigenous peoples, women and children. In the case of conflict, courts have 
to balance those right regimes according to the proportionality test.
The Proportionality Test: Weighing and Balancing Rights in Conflict
The set of tools preferred nowadays is the proportionality test in a “wide sense”, used 
and developed by the German Federal Constitutional Court and systematised by Ale-
xy. This proportionality test in a wide sense will give precedence to some principle, 
4. In the US, “bright-line rule test” is a clearly defined standard composed of objective factors, which 
leaves little room for varying interpretation. The purpose of a bright-line test is to produce predict-
able rulings. It is contrasted with the “balancing test”: cases where the judge has to “weigh” the 
importance of multiple “fuzzy” factors (“fine line” issues), which reduces objectivity and flexibility 
and increases legal indeterminacy. Adjudication in those cases tends to be more complicated and 
there is more room for judicial discretion and flexibility.
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conditioned to the facts of the case (Alexy, 2002b, p. 47). It proceeds in three steps: 
suitability, necessity and proportionality in a narrow sense (Alexy, 2002b, p. 66). The 
first two, the suitability and the necessity tests, consider the application of right-prin-
ciples (optimisation requirements) against what is factually possible (Alexy, 2002a, 
pp. 572-581). The third step is the proportionality test in a narrow sense, which con-
siders the application of principles-optimisation requirements against what is legally 
possible. The “legally possible” situations are cases of fundamental rights adjudica-
tion, which consist of competing principles, which have to be weighed and balanced 
(Alexy, 2002b, pp. 65-66-80-81-188). Therefore, in a wide sense, the proportionality 
test considers the following elements: suitability, necessity and proportionality in a 
strict sense.
(a) Suitability: this step requires adequacy between means and public goals and - 
as with the necessity element - it is related to what is factually possible. It is related 
to the kind of measure taken and its appropriateness in order to achieve the aim. 
The State’s restrictions have to be adequate in order to protect that significant legal 
interest, such as children’s rights. Such suitability means that the measure has to be 
sufficient enough in order to achieve the goal. The restriction of rights will be valid if 
it endeavours to protect a legal interest or collective goods, relevant in the context of 
a democratic society. Legal texts normally provide notions or grounds that can limit 
a right, such as “public order”, “public morality”, “national security” or “protection of 
health”, all of them collective goods or public interests, which also have the structure 
of principles (Alexy, 2002b, pp. 69-86-102). In Hart’s words, those terms are an “open 
texture” and courts give them concrete meaning in every case they adjudicate (Hart, 
1982, p. 124). It can be asked whether the general criminal law rules related to sexual 
crimes and domestic violence (which protects children and women) are an appro-
priate restriction to indigenous rights, which grants them some degree of autonomy.
(b) Necessity: this second step is also related to what is factually possible.  It is also 
called the “minimum harm” principle; the restrictions have to be strictly indispensa-
ble for obtaining the legitimate goal. There has to be a link of causality between the 
restriction and the aim pursued. This requisite is a mandate to the public body which 
takes the decision. If there is a range of options, the state authority has to take the 
alternative that least affects the right in question.  State measures must be used in the 
least intrusive way possible. In simple words, the decision-maker can only sacrifice 
part of a right to protect the core of another right. Courts should choose the means 
that render compatible two or more principles otherwise in conflict (Alexy, 2002b, 
p. 66). It may be asked whether the criminal law rules are minimum restrictions to 
indigenous rights in order to protect children’s or women’s rights.
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(c) Proportionality in a strict sense: this is the last step of the “wide” test. Rights are 
optimising elements to be contrasted against other rights-principles, i.e. “the right of 
others” (Bomhoff, 2008, pp. 619-654) and considering what is legally possible. Some 
legal systems give more importance to some rights-principles over other ones, for 
example, the wide freedom of religion guaranteed in the US (Curry, 1986), which con-
trasts with the French more restrictive conception. In the case of conflicting princi-
ples-rights, the judge must consider “the greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or 
the detriment to, one principle (right), the greater importance of satisfying the other 
(right-principle)” (Alexy, 2002b, p. 102). In the task of balancing the different interests 
involved in a controversy, the decision-maker has to prefer one of them and to do that 
he has to “weigh” them. Because constitutional rights are principles and not rules, the 
conflicts between them do not have an easy solution, subsuming (pure logic) is not 
available: the only choice is balancing in a legal-arithmetic way. The decision-maker 
has to consider the intensity of the intervention-restriction and the importance of 
the legal interest pursued: balance the benefit and the sacrifice. Alexy suggests that 
by contrasting both rights, the decision-maker has to verify if the rights are or will be 
“seriously, moderate or slightly” restricted or harmed according to the “weight for-
mula”, an empirical assumption (Alexy, 2012/2013, pp. 465-477). Also, the importance 
of satisfying the second principle in conflict can be determined by reference to the 
same three-fold weight scale: light, moderate or serious (Alexy, 2002b, p. 402). This 
formula quantifies the concrete weight given to a right-principle in comparison with 
a colliding right-principle in a specific case-law. According to this formula, the judge 
has to assign a weight to the rights-principles in competition, calculate the intensity 
of interference of each other, the degree to which the opposite right-principle is not 
achieved (Alexy, 2003, pp. 433-449). The restriction of a right cannot mean that this 
right is obliterated; the irreducible core of that right cannot be reduced to nothing. 
The essential core of human rights is a minimum non-derogable, inviolable, inaliena-
ble nucleus of freedoms. When deciding a conflict, and when proceeding to the com-
parison of two interests, the right that will prevail is the one whose core is seriously 
affected. Put simply, the maximum realisation of one right has to coexist with the 
minimum restriction of the other one. One right prevails but the other one does not 
disappear. Consequently, courts will have to determine if some kind of rules, such as 
the age of consent, affect the very core of indigenous rights and the autonomy granted 
to them in order to accept, for example, their customs as a valid source of law.
According to Alexy, a court can limit a constitutional right by appealing to other 
fundamental rights if there is a justified reason and only if the measure is necessary 
in order to obtain a legitimate result. In conclusion, the proportionality test in a wide 
sense consists of verifying that the restrictions to rights have a legitimate goal and 
those limitations are appropriate, necessary and proportionate in order to obtain that 
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aim. The theory of adjudication on fundamental rights, according to Alexy, is in es-
sence a theory of balancing (Alexy, 2003, pp. 433-449). The adjudication of the case 
where there are two or more rights-principles in conflict will be a derivative judicial 
rule that represents an integrated normative solution applicable to the factual context 
supported by the evidence. That ruling will establish a relation of preference among 
rights-principles which depends of the facts of the case (Alexy, 2002b, pp. 48-52).
The proportionality test offers a lucid and comprehensible rational framework, 
which clarifies the multiple variables in fundamental rights adjudication. Using these 
tools, decisions are justified logically and the elements that the judge considers are 
explicit in the rulings. His theory does not predetermine the legal answer to cases 
that involve collisions of rights-principles. It only gives analytical tools for articula-
ting legal reasoning and, at the same time, rulings could be criticised on the basis of 
those very legal tools. Legal reasoning in those cases cannot achieve the precision 
of arithmetical operations. There is always legitimate discretion at every level of the 
legal system and with these tools courts can justify their interpretation and applica-
tion of pre-existing legal material. Alexy demonstrates that there is not only a single 
correct answer to any constitutional rights issue because rights could be weighted 
in a dissimilar way. The proportionality test just provides a rational justification for 
rulings using legal bases. Different judges could weigh rights in a diverse way and, 
subsequently, the decision will be different but correct and justified in the legal sense. 
The scales of the weight formula and the values assigned to every right-principle in 
conflict are, in a high degree, almost intuitive (D’amato, 1983, pp. 1-55)5. There is no 
pre-established graduation of the relative importance of rights or its restrictions. The 
legal tradition of the country will be relevant and may tip the balance of justice. For 
that reason, different approaches can be found in Bolivian, Chilean and Colombian 
Courts. Alexy recognised that his test is just a useful tool in adjudication, but it does 
not give complete legal certainty. Of course, the facts of the case are also essential. I 
will examine the proportionality test using practical examples of conflicting human 
rights regimes examining the situation of women and children. The proportionality 
test could help us to better understand the courts’ reasoning.
5. Alexy’s framework is lucid, however it does not eliminate legal uncertainty.  Judges do not decide 
cases formalistically. Law is not always consistent, complete and clear. Rather, the legal system is 
riddled with ambiguities, gaps, vague terms, and conflicting interpretation techniques. As a result, 
there is often no uniquely right answer to any hard case.  Law is intrinsically uncertain and it is 
neither arithmetic nor mathematical logic. Then, judges’ legal intuition, based on their experience, 
is relevant when assessing cases.
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Indigenous autonomy and women’s rights
The relationship between indigenous autonomy and women’s rights is a complex one, 
not always there is a clash between them. In some cases, the indigenous autonomy 
potentiates women’s rights. In other cases, there will be conflict, and then Courts 
have to apply the proportionality test choosing the international human rights regime 
that will prevail, the ILO-169/UNDRIP or the CEDAW.
Potentiation of rights
Colombia is the current epicentre of constitutional law. The Colombian Constitu-
tional Court is one of the most original interpreters of constitutional law nowadays. 
It has exercised a considerable amount of judicial activism on economic and social 
rights, even altering the national budget. The Colombian Constitutional Court’s juris-
prudence on indigenous rights is also fairly avant-garde.
In T-778/20056, the Constitutional Court had to decide a case in which an indi-
genous woman was elected in local balloting, but the poll was challenged because 
she did not have the minimum age required by statutory law to be a candidate. The 
Court ruled in her favour and dismissed the challenge. In the opinion of the Court, 
indigenous peoples have the collective right to cultural identity, which creates ethno-
cultural diversity exceptions to general rules. In that specific indigenous culture to 
which the candidate belonged, the right to political participation can be granted at 
an earlier age if the woman has performed the customary rituals in order to exercise 
political participation in that indigenous community. In the Court’s view, cultural-
ethnical diversity is a principle acknowledged by the Constitution. Furthermore, the 
ILO-169 is part of the block of constitutionality7 and reinforces what is said in the 
Constitution. Then, annulling the election due to a small legal technicality will be a 
violation of her political rights. The Court set the principle of indigenous autonomy 
and cultural diversity above statutory formalities. Subsequently, as a side effect, that 
supra-legal rank (that means above the rules set in the acts of parliament) of indige-
nous autonomy increases indigenous women’s political rights. In that way, the ILO 
169 regime is complementary to the CEDAW one.  However, as it will be examined, 
this is not a common phenomenon.
6. Ati Seygundiba Quigua Izquierdo contra Tribunal Administrativo de Cundinamarca Sección 
Primera Subsección A, Colombia, T-778/2005 (27/07/2005), tutela, Colombian Constitutional 
Court.
7. Bloc de constitutionnalité is a concept coined by the Constitutional Council of France and means 
the set of higher legal norms which is used in order to control the constitutionality of legislation, 
Decisión nr. 71-44 DC “Liberté d’association”, 16/07/1971, Conseil Constitutionnel. This concept has 
spread among several countries, among them the Latin American ones.
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Conflict between regimes
The situation described above is not usual and normally judges have to give pre-emi-
nence either to indigenous autonomy or to women’s rights. I will analyse case-law 
related to sexual and domestic violence. In both areas, judges have to choose between 
which right prevails (victims’ rights or indigenous autonomy). In order to do that, 
judges utilise the proportionality test and the indigenous ethos of the country will 
play a relevant role in adjudication.
The ILO-169 recognises natives as protected peoples and gives vast importance 
to aboriginal custom as a source of law which has been considered as an essential 
element in criminal and civil cases that involved environmental protection; sexual 
crimes; drug traffic, etc8. The ILO-169 considers indigenous custom as a source of 
law, especially as a way to mitigate criminal liability. Indigenous custom is related to 
cultural defences. Cultural defences are a sort of criminal defence which include a 
set of circumstances which justify or excuse the criminal behaviour. In all the cases, 
the defendants have displayed the conduct described and labelled as criminal by law. 
However, some conditions justify or excuse the behaviour; ergo, criminal punishment 
may not be applied. Those “conditions” are the values of individuals who are raised 
in indigenous, often minority cultures that may, at times, conflict with the values of 
the dominant, often majoritarian culture (which is embodied in the domestic crimi-
nal law) (Van Broeck, 2001, pp. 1-32). The conduct is justified when the behaviour 
displayed is legitimate even though it contradicts general law. One example of that is 
the possession of substances categorised as drugs by the law. In Chile, Aymara indi-
genous people have been acquitted for possession of coca leaves because they were 
exercising their freedom of religion, since those coca leaves are relevant in their cus-
tomary rituals. What is more, that behaviour is legally justified by Article 27 of the 
ICCPR (Cespedes, 2017a) and Article 8 of the ILO-169 (Cespedes, 2017b). In other 
cases, the conduct is only excused, which means that the behaviour is illegitimate 
but it does not deserve criminal punishment because there are surrounding circum-
stances that explain the conduct. For example, there is another Chilean case about 
homicide, contra Juana Catrilaf (1953)9 motivated by witchcraft. The victim allegedly 
practiced witchcraft and, according to the villagers and the defendant, had cursed 
the whole town. The Appeal Court of Valdivia confirmed the first instance ruling 
that absolved the defendant, a Mapuche native who murdered the “witch”, because 
the community in which she lived was remote from modern civilisation and ‘magical 
8. Because of those features, an inter-disciplinary approach is vital in order to apply the law with 
fairness.  Social sciences such as anthropology, ethnography and sociology provide a context in 
order to fully understand indigenous law.
9. Contra Juana Catrilaf, Revista Derecho y Jurisprudencia (Julio-Agosto/1955) 52.5-6, 85-102. Cor-
te de Apelaciones de Valdivia. Confirma Consulta.
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thinking’ was a collective belief in that community. According to the Court, the de-
fendant was sincerely scared; in simple words, factual mistakes were a valid excuse 
in their cultural background. Anthropologists as expert witnesses were essential in 
order to validate her defence. They stated that witchcraft was common in Mapuche’s 
worldview and the accused behaved, from her standpoint and mental state, in self-
defence. The Court stressed that the powers that allegedly the witch possessed, its 
source (a talisman) and the ritual of killing sorcerers were according to that ancestral 
tradition. Maybe a better and current example would be the Maripil Case (2012)10, 
in which two people were killed and 14 were injured in a ‘battle’ over some disputed 
land between two indigenous groups. There were ‘problems of coexistence’ between 
the two tribes, and one of them was known as ‘violent’ and previous threats were 
proven. The other clan was ‘afraid,’ so coordinated a ‘preventive attack’ (called Malón 
by the mapuche) against the other group. As a consequence, 18 natives were charged 
criminally. The Supreme Court ruled that there was criminal liability, but it had to 
be mitigated because those crimes occurred in the context of an “ancient solution of 
conflicts of coexistence in the Mapuche tradition”, which involves a violent eviction 
when members of the community do not live according to the standards of the tribe.
I will analyse cultural defences in the context of sexual crimes and domestic violence 
perpetrated by Latin American indigenous people. It will be seen that different coun-
tries, with diverse legal culture, grant relatively dissimilar “weight” to different rights 
in conflict.
Sexual crimes
Several aspects of sexual activity are regulated by law. In general, criminal laws may 
proscribe acts which are considered a sort of sexual abuse (rape, for example). At the 
same time some communities prohibit behaviour which is considered to be inappro-
priate and against the social norms, which is sometimes connected with taboos (for 
example, incest or homosexuality). Law regulates the age of consent and controls the 
censorship of obscene material as well. However, laws vary from one jurisdiction to 
another11 and have varied over time12. In an indigenous context, age of consent has 
generated some legal problems.
10. Contra Maripil Porteño y otros, Corte Suprema, casación penal y sentencia de reemplazo, Rol 
2683-2010.
11. One example may be the regulation of sexually explicit materials. In the UK, a Danish sex educa-
tion textbook for school students was censored by the English courts.  It reached the ECtHR and the 
Court supported the censorship on grounds of protecting public morals as a legitimate valid restric-
tion to freedom of speech. The ECtHR considered that the standards were different in Denmark 
than the UK on matters of sexual education, and then the ban was under the margin of appreciation. 
Handyside case (1976), App. 5493/72, known as The Little Red Schoolbook case.
12. In Europe, the situation has dramatically changed over time. For example, in WB v Germany
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The age of consent is the age at which a person is considered to be legally compe-
tent to consent to sexual acts13. Then, this is the minimum age of a person with whom 
another person is legally allowed to engage in sexual activity. The relevant aspect of 
the age of consent laws is that the person below the minimum age is regarded as the 
victim and, consequently, his/her sex partner may be regarded as the offender. Age of 
consent laws differ far and wide from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, most ju-
risdictions worldwide set the age of consent in the range of 14 to 18-years-old (Waites, 
2005). Statutory law just reflects the majority consensus on the topic. That regulation 
may differ with the culture of some indigenous peoples. In the cases of Chile and Co-
lombia, the age of consent is specifically set by their Criminal Codes, but indigenous 
people could have a more elastic way of setting it. For that reason, some cases have 
reached courts.
In Chile, a relevant judgment is the Ñanco case14. A 40-year-old Mapuche com-
mitted statutory rape; his victim was a 13-year-old indigenous girl (the age of consent 
in Chile is 14). The expert witness established that ancient practice had legitimated 
sexual intercourse since the onset of menarche, thus Mapuche are not conscious of 
having committed a crime. The Court recognised that, culturally, those practices are 
allowed in isolated communities, but the accused lived close to urban centres and had 
access to radio and TV. Moreover, his personal history showed that he was aware of 
the values shared by the majority of the country. Then, the defendant was convicted. 
The ILO-169 played a relevant part in this discussion since it is quoted as the source 
of the cultural defence. However, that defence did not prosper. The defendants’ per-
sonal history tipped the balance of justice. In other words, indigenous culture was 
(1955), App. 104/55, the Commission ruled the criminalisation of sodomy as a legitimate restriction 
of personal freedom.  Sixty years later, in Oliari v Italy (2015), App. 18766/11, the ECtHR estab-
lished a positive obligation upon member states to provide legal recognition for same-sex couples.
13. It is normal that statutes set the age of criminal responsibility, the voting age, marriageable age, 
the drinking age, the driving age, etc.  Sometimes Courts determine when maturity is reached for 
particular purposes. For example, in the UK, a child is able to consent to his/her own medical treat-
ment, without the need for parental permission or knowledge (Gillick competence), Gillick v West 
Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402 (HL). A health departmental cir-
cular stated that the prescription of contraception was a matter for the doctor’s discretion, and that 
they could be prescribed to children without parental consent. Mrs. Gillick claimed that prescribing 
contraception was illegal because it encouraged sexual intercourse with a minor and a violation 
of parents’ rights. The House of Lords held the authority of parents to make decisions for their 
children is not absolute and diminishes with the child’s evolving maturity.  This idea is in line with 
the concept of progressive autonomy of the CRC. In the US, there is a similar term called “mature 
minor doctrine”, according to it, a child may possess the maturity to choose or reject a particular 
health care treatment, sometimes without the knowledge or agreement of parents, and then, should 
be permitted to do so.
14. Contra J.V.Ñ.Ñ., Judgment RUC 0400415571-3 (23 November 2005). Tribunal Penal Oral Te-
muco.
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not powerful enough as a factor to explain and excuse the criminal behaviour. The 
victim’s rights had more “weight” than indigenous tradition. As it was explained, Chi-
le does not grant wide recognition to indigenous peoples since they represent a small 
part of the population. Maybe that was also an important factor that tipped the ba-
lance of justice.
In Colombia the situation is different as it can be seen in the ‘Cesar’ and ‘Cata-
lina’ case15. Cesar (aged 26) was dating Catalina and she became pregnant (aged 13). 
Both were indigenous people. Under the law this was considered to be statutory rape 
because a 13-year-old girl is under the age of consent for sexual intercourse (the age 
of consent in Colombia is 14-years-old). First, the ordinary court presiding over the 
case ordered Cesar’s arrest and detention in a regular jail (even though it recogni-
sed he was not a danger to society). Since in Cesar’s opinion, his indigenous culture 
was not respected in jail, he challenged the decision. The Colombian Constitutional 
Court ruled that the first instance court had been incompetent, its ruling was null 
and void, and it had not respected indigenous culture. Even where an ordinary court 
is competent, it must respect indigenous culture. The Constitutional Court awarded 
jurisdiction to indigenous authorities and ordered them to consider the case making 
the universal value of the child’s best interest the main priority. Situations like this 
are not uncommon among indigenous people and clearly it was not a matter of abuse 
having been committed. In fact, the case reached ordinary courts in an indirect way. 
The situation is similar to the Chilean case, but small differences can tip the balance 
of justice as well as the importance that diverse legal systems grant to indigenous 
autonomy.
Domestic violence
In most countries, laws exist to protect the victim of domestic violence16. Domes-
tic violence is punishable in dissimilar ways. One difference among societies is to 
what extent those conducts are punished. In fact, it could be considered as civil illicit, 
misdemeanour or crime. Even though when it is considered a crime, its featured pu-
nishment could be diverse. In Chile, a criminal domestic violence procedure cannot 
be closed by an economic compensation. On the other hand, in Mapuche law, every 
conflict can be solved with compensation. That has been a point of legal controversy. 
On a domestic violence case that involves indigenous people courts have to choo-
se between protecting women as a vulnerable group or respect Mapuche customary 
law. Courts must adjudicate on two human rights protection regimes. An excellent 
15. Judgment T-921/13 (5 December 2013), Constitutional Court of Colombia.
16. Of course, in any community, there are beliefs and attitudes that support domestic violence. 
Globally, the victims of domestic violence are overwhelmingly women.
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example of this problem is the Cheuquellán Reinao case. A first instance criminal 
court accepted a compensatory agreement even though Chilean law forbids them in 
respect of domestic violence cases. The Court based its ruling on the ILO 169, which 
considers indigenous custom to be a source of law17. The Temuco Court of Appeal 
upheld the first instance ruling18, which gave preference to compensatory agreements 
above the clear statutory prohibition, an example of the Convention prevailing over 
domestic legislation. A disciplinary action was brought against the appeal court jud-
ges but the Supreme Court dismissed it19. Two out of the five appeal judges dissented, 
arguing that their colleagues had directly disobeyed Chilean law. Domestic violence 
is a social problem and there was a specific goal behind the addition of that rule: to 
correct gender inequalities within families. A particularly delicate balance has to be 
maintained in cases such as this. Recently, that same Appeal Court of Temuco has 
delivered rulings that contradicts what was decided in Cheuquellán Reinao20. Diverse 
interests in conflict could be balanced in different ways and facts and culture can tip 
the balance of justice.
Inheritance
Inheritance is the passing on rights and obligations upon the death of a person (his/
her estate or patrimony). Intestacy law refers to the laws that determines who is entit-
led to the property from the estate under the rules of inheritance and also regulates 
the distribution of the estate of a person who dies without having in force a valid will. 
Normally, property goes first to a spouse, then to children and their descendants; if 
there are no descendants, the rule sends you back up the family tree to the parents, 
the siblings, etc., and usually so on further to the more remote degrees of kinship. 
The laws of inheritance diverge among societies and have changed over time. In the 
Western world, those rules are neutral and tend to be apply with equality and non-
discrimination. A person (testator) can regulate how his/her estate will be distributed 
after his/her death by a document called will or testament. The principle of complete 
freedom of disposition by testament is part of the common law systems, but it is not 
universal. Actually, total freedom is the exception rather than the rule in Civil law sys-
tems, which often set some restrictions on the possibilities of disposal.  In fact, man-
datory rules establish “forced heirship”, which is a feature of civil law systems (among 
17. Judgment RUC 1100529076-9 (14 October 2011).
18. Judgment Rol No. 955-2011 (27 October 2011), Corte de Apelaciones de Temuco.
19. Judgment Rol No. 10635-2011 (4 January 2012).
20. Unfortunately, I have not found a Bolivian or Colombian case on the same matter.  However, 
considering the autonomy granted to indigenous court and the rank granted to indigenous customs, 
solutions could be diverse.
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them, Bolivia) which do not acknowledge complete freedom of testation. Forced 
heirship is a kind of testate partible inheritance whereby the estate of a deceased is 
separated in two: an indefeasible portion, the forced estate, passing to the deceased’s 
next-of-kin, and a discretionary portion, which can be freely disposed of by will. For-
ced heirship then forbids disinheritance except for a few narrowly-defined grounds 
that a testator is obliged to prove. Most modern states employ egalitarian inheritance, 
without discrimination based on gender. However, some indigenous traditions have 
customs of patrilineal inheritance, where only males can inherit. Those customs can 
enter into conflict with equality as guaranteed in treaties and constitutions.
In the Montoya Mamani case (2014)21, the Bolivian Constitutional Court had to 
balance indigenous rights against general international human rights law. An indige-
nous person wrote a testament and last will including his brother’s land. His brother 
had joined the military, did not work his land and, according of indigenous tradi-
tion, lost it because he did not work it, not fulfilling the social purpose of land. The 
testator’s wife and kids inherited the land. The soldier brother reappeared and clai-
med his land. He convinced the indigenous community to put pressure on the widow. 
She was threat on getting the land back to the community if she did not give up 50% 
of her family’s land to the testator’s brother. She did that under pressure but after the 
retracted. After that, she was excluded from community meetings. It was argued that 
because she was a woman she did not have right to that land according to their indige-
nous tradition. The Bolivian Constitutional Court ruled the indigenous community’s 
decision violated the claimant’s fundamental rights. Land has a social role, and it was 
lost for its owner if it is not worked. What is more, women and children were vulne-
rable groups and needed extra protection. Even though indigenous custom is a source 
of law recognized by the Bolivian Constitution, it has its limits. Applying that custom 
could have affected the core of the claimant’s rights.
Conclusions
From the judgments analysed, it is clear that, in some cases, ILO-169 has increased 
women’s freedoms; for instance, on issues related to political participation in Colom-
bia. Instead, in more than a few areas there have been serious challenges to women’s 
liberties and different human rights regimes conflict to each other. The ILO-169 and 
Latin American legislation contemplate indigenous custom as a source of law, parti-
cularly as a manner to diminish criminal liability. ILO-169 has been applied in recent 
Bolivian, Chilean and Colombian case-law, and the defendants have claimed “cultu-
ral defences”, on occasion successfully or the indigenous tradition has been balanced 
21. Sentencia constitucional Plurinacional 0323/2014.
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by courts against other relevant interests. In those cases, victims’ rights (women/
children) are clearly less protected. Simultaneously, ILO-169 permits the existence of 
indigenous tribunals with jurisdiction to deal with some wrongdoings, jurisdiction 
that can affect women in a discriminatory way, such as the Bolivian case commented. 
In these areas, understanding indigenous cosmogonies is vital in order to assess the 
question put to trial and the following decision.
The proportionality test has been an instrument in adjudication, directly or indi-
rectly, as is shown in the case-law analysed. At the same time, the dissimilar presence 
of indigenous population seems to have influenced domestic legal culture, which tips 
the balance of justice. Judges seem to tacitly consider the relevance of indigenous 
culture in each country in order to “weigh” the rights in conflict.
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